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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
senting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Fortas, 6 joined by
Justices Brennan and Douglas in a separate dissent." Nor is there
much comport for the proponent of the Status quo in the majority's
reluctant affirmance."8 The announcement by Justice Clark, who
voted with the majority, that he intends to retire from the Court 9
further weakens the holding of Spencer and leaves to speculation
whether his replacement would vote for or against affirming if and
when the question is again presented. More importantly, two of the
dissenting Justices felt that the common law procedure for applying
recidivist statutes "undermined 'the very integrity of the fact finding
process' "30 and would have applied their dissents retroactively. As
is noted in the North Carolina Attorney General's amicus curiae
brief, to strike down the common law procedure would be to nullify
North Carolina statutes and holdings."1 To apply such a decision
retroactively would also nullify convictions obtained using these pro-
cedures. Thus, it would seem prudent to consider changing the
statute on these very practical grounds as well as on the policy basis
discussed above.
PHILIP G. CARSON
Criminal Law and Procedure-Harmless Error
The harmless-error statutes and rules' now utilized by all the
states and in the federal judicial system2 are the product of judicial
"87 Sup. Ct. at 656.
'" Id. at 666.
"See notes 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
"Time, Mar. 10, 1967, p. 22.
'o 87 Sup. Ct. at 666. Compare, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1965).
'1 Brief of the Attorney General of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae,
p. 2, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
'Typical of the harmless-error provisions is the California harmless-
error provision which provides:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case,
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admis-
sion or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice.
CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4Y2.
'28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1965) provides:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the
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reform early in this century. They arose from the desire to allow
appellate courts to judge whether minor trial errors materially affect
the outcome of a trial.' In effect, they provide that there may be
some errors which in the setting of a particular case may be deemed
harmless, thus not resulting in automatic reversal. In Chapman v.
California,4 the United States Supreme Court restricted state harm-
less-error provisions as applied to denial of rights guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution. The rule announced by Mr. justice Black
for the Court states that where there is an error of state procedure
or state law, the states may continue to apply their harmless-error
rules.5 However, state appellate judges may overlook federal con-
stitutional violations only if the court is able to find that the error
is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale were con-
victed of a 1962 robbery-slaying. At the time of the trial, Article
I, § 13 of the California Constitution provided that a defendant's
failure to testify could be commented upon and could be considered
by the court or jury.' Neither defendant testified at the trial and
the prosecutor, relying on Article I, § 13, filled his argument to the
jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence
and inferences of their guilt resulting therefrom." The judge also
charged the jury that they could draw adverse inferences from the
failure to testify.' After trial, but before petitioners appeal had
court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.
FED. R. CRIm. P. 52(a) provides:
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
' See, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759-60 (1946).
'386 U.S. 18 (1967).
5Id. at 21.
8Id. at 24.
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 provides:
in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his
failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts
in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.
. Excerpts of the prosecutor's argument are reproduced in the appendix
of the majority opinion. 386 U.S. at 26-42.
'The trial judge charged the jury:
It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he
may not be compelled to testify. Thus, whether or not he does testify
rests entirely on his own decision. As to any evidence or facts against
him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or ex-
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been considered by the California Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court declared in Griffin v. California'0 that such com-
ment was a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination." When the California Supreme Court heard the ap-
peal of Chapman,' 2 the court, while admitting that petitioners had
been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their
silence, nevertheless ruled that the convictions could stand because
the comments to the jury were harmless errors that did not affect
the verdict.' 3 Applying the new test announced in his opinion, Mr.
Justice Black held that California had failed to show the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus reversed the convic-
tion. 4
One question which Chapman presents is whether the Court has
the power to declare this rule. This power seems questionable for
two reasons. First, nowhere does the Court state that the California
harmless-error provision is a violation of due process.' 5 Also, the
Court appears to acknowledge that other harmless-error formula-
tions would be constitutionally permissible.' The Court simply
states that the rule they announced will "provide a more workable
standard."'" Second, the Court in effect has assumed a general
supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in a
state court. While the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals
from invasion of fundamental rights,' nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment gives federal courts supervisory power in the affirma-
plain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or
if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence,
the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indi-
cate the truth of such evidence or as indicating that among the in-
ferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable
to the defendant are the more probable....
Id. at 19.
10380 U.S. 609 (1965).
11Id. at 615. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), determined
that the law as declared in Griffin was applicable to all cases that were still
pending on direct review at the time that Griffin was announced.
12 People v. Teale, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 404 P.2d 209 (1965).
1 Id. at 741, 404 P.2d at 220.
14 386 U.S. at 26.
1 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan argues that the provision does not
violate due process. Id. at 47.
o Id. at 46. Justice Black states that Congress could make a different
formulation.
'" Id. at 24.
See, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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five sense of McNabb v. United States.9 As Mr. Justice Cardozo
had occasion to remark, a state rule of law "does not run foul of
the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem...
to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the
prisoner at bar."20
But assuming that the Court has this power, there remains the
basic question of whether this new rule "will provide a more work-
able standard." In People v. Watson,2 the California court, in de-
fining its harmless-error provision, stated that reversal would be
required only when "it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached," and this
judgment "must necessarily be based upon reasonable probabilities
rather than upon mere possibilities."2 Thus, the difference between
the California "miscarriage of justice" test for harmless error and
the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" test announced by Mr.
Justice Black would seem to be largely verbalistic. However, the
desirability of a uniform standard for determining whether a fed-
eral constitutional error is harmless is apparent from an examina-
tion of numerous past attempts to formulate a rule.23 Applying this
rule to all state courts will eliminate the need to determine whether
each state harmless-error provision is consistent with the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, whether the California court is applying its rule of
"miscarriage of justice" or the new rule of "harmless beyond a
" 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The Court held that incriminating statements
elicited from defendants during unlawful detention by federal officials are
inadmissible in federal courts. The Court stated that "the scope of our
reviewing power over convictions brought here from the federal courts is
not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional validity." Id. at 340.
"0 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Spencer
v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) where the Court holds that the Constitu-
tion does not ordain the Supreme Court with authority as rule-making
organ for promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure. Id. at 569.
2146 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956).
2" Id. at 837, 299 P.2d at 255.
23 See, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) where the Court
stated the material factors of the harmless-error rules to be the character
of the proceedings, what is at stake upon its outcome, and the relation of
the error asserted to casting the balance for decision on the case as a
whole. Id. at 762. In Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) the majority
of five held the test of harmless error to be whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction. Id. at 86-87. The four dissenters said the standard was a
determination that exclusion of the unconstitutional evidence could not have
changed the outcome of the trial. Id. at 95.
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reasonable doubt," the same question will remain-is the applica-
tion of the rule to the alleged error a reasonable one or was the
rule applied arbitrarily to destroy or dilute constitutional guaran-
tees? To answer this question, the Court, under whatever rule it
promulgates, will have to look to each state court decision to see if
the rule was reasonably applied. This will entail not only looking at
the case in dispute but looking at previous applications of the rule.
Furthermore, it seems that the impact of the new rule is weak-
ened by the fact that state courts can continue to apply their state
harmless-error statutes to state errors.24 That a state judge will
mentally shift gears and consider one set of criteria to see if there is
a miscarriage of justice and another set of criteria to see if the error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt seems unlikely. In California,
the holding in Chapman would probably be the same whichever
criteria is used.25
Apart from the question of whether this new rule "will provide
a more workable standard" is the question of whether a violation
of Griffin should ever be subject to a harmless-error rule. It is
conceded by the Court that there can be errors which in a particular
setting may be so insignificant that they can be considered harm-
less."' Also, it is stated that there are some constitutional rights
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error and will result in automatic reversal.2 7 The majority
opinion would seem to indicate that in a particular context a viola-
tion of Griffin could be harmless. This view seems to be in direct
contravention of Griffin which held that "the Fifth Amendment...
forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence
or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. '28
A more desirable result to the case is found in the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Stewart. He holds that violation of Griffin should
2'386 U.S. at 21.
" The California court held that there was no miscarriage of justice be-
cause the proof of guilt was overwhelming. 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 740-41, 404
P.2d 209, 220 (1965).
" Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (denial of permission to
accused to attend a view held harmless); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458 (1900) (erroneous admission of written statement not prejudicial error).
"' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge). The concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Stewart expands this list considerably. 386 U.S. at 42-45.
11 380 U.S. at 615.
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never be treated as harmless error and should result in automatic
reversal.29 Harmless-error statutes are designed to stop reversals
due to unimportant technicalities. But a violation of Griffin is a
conscious act on the part of the prosecution or the court. To hold
out the possibility that this violation could be harmless would only
seem to tempt the unethical and award the ignorant.
The adoption of this harmless-error rule has thus committed
the Court to a case-by-case determination of the extent to which
unconstitutional comment on a defendant's failure to testify influ-
enced the outcome of a particular trial; i.e., was the comment "harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt?" This substantial burden could
have been avoided by placing Griffin violations in the category of
Constitutional rights so basic that infractions can never be harmless
error and will result in automatic reversal. Thus, the most that can
be said at present is that Chapman has clouded the holding of
Griffin, a cloud which hopefully will be dispelled in further deci-
sions.30
EUGENE W. PURDOM
Federal Practice-Sovereign Immunity and Counterclams
Against the Government under the Tucker Act
A problem that has arisen time and again under the Tucker
Act1 involves the question of whether a defendant who has a claim
against the Government, which claim could be the subject of an
original suit under the Tucker Act, may assert it as a counterclaim
in an action brought by the Government against him in a federal
court. Any discussion of this problem must begin with the general
proposition that the Government cannot be sued unless it has con-
sented to be sued and then only in the manner in which it has so
" 386 U.S. at 45. See also O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966)
where the Court reversed a Griffin violation without even mentioning
harmless error.
"The question remains as to what other constitutional violations will
be subject to the harmless-error test. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967), a companion case of Chapman, the Court did not reach the
question of whether the harmless-error test should be applied to Fourth
Amendment violations, as it ruled that the search was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 59.
124 Stat. 505 (1887).
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